This paper presents a microfounded model of money where durable assets serve as a guarantee to repay consumption loans. We establish steady state equilibria where money and bank credit coexist. In such an equilibrium, a larger investment in durable capital relaxes the borrowing constraint faced by consumers and thus provides a way to mitigate their costs of money holdings. We show that the occurrence of over-investment and the behavior of capital accumulation depend on the rate of inflation, relative risk aversion of agents and the marginal productivity of the capital goods.
Introduction
Frictions are a necessary ingredient for money to emerge as a medium of exchange. Anonymity is essential. In a recent study, Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2006) establish a framework in which agents' anonymity is preserved on the goods market but not on the credit market, and bank credit plays a beneficial role. Anonymity may, however, impede the smooth working of credit systems, which are based on the exclusion of those who default from future access to loans. Lagos and Rocheteau (2006) study an economy where agents' anonymity is pervasive and trading arrangements based on capital goods, like cattle in primitive societies, can serve as a medium of exchange. In the present study, we take the view that markets are subject to frictions, and in particular, agents are anonymous in both good and credit deals. We present an alternative model in which anonymous agents can use capital goods, like real estate, as a guarantee of repayment of bank loans. We are motivated by the fact that still to the day, collateral secured loans account for a high percentage of all loans in industrialized countries. 1 The environment we consider is a version of the divisible money framework developed in Lagos and Wright (2005) . 2 In our economy a competitive banking system operates. Banks do not have monitoring or enforcement technologies. Agents can, however, obtain a bank loan by committing their capital asset as collateral and by signing a contract, which stipulates an amount of money, an interest payment, and the obligation to repay the loan. Banks have the ability to seize the committed capital if repayment does not happen. As the amount of borrowing is bounded by the level of capital they hold, agents are subject to a borrowing constraint of the form studied by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) in a non-monetary economy.
Within this setup, accumulating capital over and above what it would be optimal from a purely productive point of view is a way for agents to relax their borrowing constraint.
Two situations can arise as steady state monetary equilibria where money and bank credit coexist: one is where the borrowing constraint is not binding and capital is at the first best 1 According to the last Federal Reserve Survey of Terms of Business Lending released on September 19th in 2006, the value of all commercial and industrial loans secured by collateral made by US banks accounted for 46.9 percent of the total value of loans in the US. Especially for commercial loans, the typical asset used as collateral is real estate. In 2004, 47.9 percent of the US households had home-secured debt, whereby their house was used as a guarantee of repayment (Survey of Consumer Finances, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2004) . 2 The present model has features in common with Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2006) , which introduces bank credit, and Aruoba and Wright (2003) , which introduces capital accumulation in the Lagos and Wright model. We discuss these and other related works at the end of Section 3. level, whereas the other is where the borrowing constraint is binding and capital is above the first best level. Given the demand for bank credit, the tightness of borrowing constraint is determined by the amount of capital to use for a given production, and the constraint is likely to be binding when capital is relatively scarce.
As the contract with a bank is written in nominal term, a financial obligation toward the bank is free from real costs of inflation, thereby the demand for bank credit increases in response to inflation. In turn, the binding borrowing constraint constitutes a channel through which monetary growth affects capital accumulation. We show that the effect of inflation on capital investment decision is determined by the marginal net benefit of making a loan relative to that of money holdings. For example, capital accumulation is decreasing in the rate of inflation if relative risk aversion of agents is lower than one. In this case, the demand for consumption is more than unit elastic in inflation, hence agents reduce their need for capital as collateral for loans. The same logic applies to the other cases where relative risk aversion is equal to (greater than) one and capital accumulation is constant (increasing) in inflation. At low rates of inflation, we also found a possibility that scarce capital implies credit rationing for borrowers and yields zero nominal interest rate. In such a case, the borrowing constraint is strictly tight and agents always overinvest in capital as inflation grows, irrelevant of the relative risk aversion parameter.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, derives the equilibrium and contains a discussion of the related literature. Section 3 concludes. All omitted proofs are contained in the Appendix.
The Model

The Environment
The model is built on a competitive version of Lagos and Wright (2005) , where agents take price as given in each market we describe below. Time is discrete and continues forever. There is a [0, 1] continuum of infinitely-lived agents. Each period is divided into two sub-periods, called day and night. A perfectly competitive market opens in each sub-period. Economic activity differs between day and night. During the day, agents can trade a perishable consumption good and face randomness in their preferences and production possibilities. An agent is a buyer with probability σ in which case he wants to consume but cannot produce, whereas an agent is a seller with probability 1 − σ in which case he is able to produce but does not wish to consume. 3 During the night, agents can trade a durable good that can be used for consumption or investment. In contrast to the first sub-period, there is no randomness in the second sub-period, and all agents can produce and consume simultaneously.
There is an intrinsically worthless good, which is perfectly divisible and storable, called fiat money. We assume that all goods trades are anonymous and so trading histories of agents are private knowledge. Combined with the presence of randomness described above, anonymity in goods trades motivates an essential role of money: sellers must receive money for immediate compensation of their products. The supply of fiat money is controlled by the government so that M = πM −1 , where M denotes the money stock at a given period, M −1 the previous period, and π the gross growth rate of the money supply which we assume to be constant.
New money is injected, or withdrawn, at the start of each period by lump-sum transfers or taxes at a rate denoted by τ . Both buyers and sellers receive these transfers, which amounts to τ M −1 , equally.
Consumption during the day yields utility u(q b ) that, we assume, satisfies u (·) > 0, u (·) < 0, u (0) = ∞, and u (∞) = 0, where q b represents the amount of daytime-consumption.
Production during the day requires utility cost c (q s ) = q s , where q s represents the amount of daytime-production. Agents obtain utility from x -i.e. consumption of durable goodsduring the night, given by U (x) = x. 4 Simultaneously, agents can produce these goods using capital k. We assume that one's capital is not mobile so that it cannot be carried into the day market. Agents have an access to a production technology f (k) that satisfies f (·) > 0, f (·) < 0, f (0) = ∞, and f (∞) = 0. In what follows, we study situations where capital is sustainable over time. That is, we study the range of capital satisfying 0 ≤ k ≤ k where k defines the the maximal sustainable level of capital and is a solution to f (k ) = k . Capital depreciates at a rate δ ∈ (0, 1). Agents discount future payoffs at a rate β ∈ (0, 1) across periods, but we assume for simplicity that there is no discounting between the two sub-periods.
There exist private competitive banks, accepting deposits and issuing loans. Each period, before entering the day market, but after having discovered whether they are going to be buyers or sellers, agents can contact a bank, in order to deposit their money or obtain a loan, denoted by d, or l, respectively. Loans are repaid and deposits are withdrawn during the night of the same period. As in goods trades, agents are anonymous in financial transactions and their credit histories are private knowledge. Banks do not have technologies that allow them to punish borrowers by excluding them from future financial transactions in case of default. The debt repayment, however, can be enforced by using collateral. Should they find themselves in need of a loan for daytime consumption, individual agents can commit part or all of their physical capital as a guarantee of repayment. The bank has the right to seize the collateral when the loan is not paid back, and thus voluntary repayment can be ensured. 5 Assuming that output is not verifiable, we focus our attention on credit deals where only capital can serve as collateral. Assuming further that individual agents have inferior skills in verifying and seizing assets relative to banks and capital is not mobile from the location where it was produced implies that promises backed by collateralized capital cannot circulate as credit among individuals during the day. 6 Hence, fiat money is still used as a medium of exchange in goods trades.
The Social Optimum
We shall begin with the first best solution. The social planner treats agents symmetrically and maximizes average expected utility. The planner's problem describes:
where
is the feasibility constraint for daytime consumption, and (2) is the feasibility constraint for nighttime consumption. At night, the amount of durable goods available for consumption, x, is provided by the total of the undepreciated and the newly 5 See Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) for an extensive discussion on the use of capital as collateral. 6 We discuss later the issue that bank notes or bilateral credit backed by physical capital could circulate among private agents, which our model does not address explicitly.
produced, F (k), minus the amount carried into the next period, k +1 .
The optimal solution in steady state, denoted by q * b , q * s , k * , x * , satisfy the following first order conditions:
and (1) and (2):
At the optimum, the marginal utility of consumption is set equal to the marginal cost of production during the day, while the marginal utility of consuming one unit of durable goods (= 1) at a given night is set equal to the discounted value of the marginal returns, accruing at the following night, from accumulating an extra unit of capital (= βF (k * )).
Steady-state equilibrium
In what follows, we construct symmetric and steady-state equilibria with money and credit (φ, l, d > 0) where all agents take identical strategies and all real variables are constant over time. Before proceeding, it is worth mentioning the characteristics of credit deals in such equilibria. First, given our environment, it is straightforward to show that buyers will not deposit their money because they will be able to use it for consumption, while sellers will not want to borrow money because they have no use of it at day. Hence, in the credit transactions with banks buyers are borrowers while sellers are depositors each day. Second, because their capital is the only asset that can be used as collateral, individual buyers face an upper bound on the amount of borrowing if they wish to consume beyond their budget. Formally, if a buyer holds capital k at a given period, then he can borrow l in total at that day, as long as it
where φ is the value of a unit of money and i the nominal interest rate (yet to be determined on the competitive credit market). The L.H.S. of the above inequality represents the realvalued repayment of his debt. The repayment happens before capital for the next period is selected, thus the above inequality holds at any given period (independently of stationarity).
An important point here is that the property of equilibrium depends on whether (5) is binding or not. When the constraint is binding, one prefers to borrow up to the maximum and so his capital holdings play dual roles, that is, one is to determine the marginal productivity of nighttime production and the other is to determine the budget set of daytime consumption as a buyer. The latter role of capital holdings is absent when the constraint is not binding.
Night market
We work backward and start with the night market. As already mentioned, during the night, agents consume, produce, and trade durable goods, and clear the credit balances they have had with banks during the day. The expected value of an agent entering the night market at a given period with holding m of money, l of loans, d of deposits and k of
where capital to the following period.
Solving (6) for x and substituting it into the value function, the first order conditions with respect to m +1 and k +1 are respectively derived as follows.
It is clear from these expressions that the m +1 , k +1 are determined independently of both m, k, and hence all agents hold the same amount of money and capital at the beginning of any given day market. 7 Finally, the envelope conditions are:
Day market Agents during the day either consume and borrow as buyers or produce and deposit as sellers. All agents start any given period with the same amount of money and capital holdings. The expected value of an agent, V (m, k), entering the day market with m money and k capital, satisfies:
where p is the nominal price of daytime goods. If the agent happens to be a buyer with probability σ, then he spends pq b money for his consumption, which is no greater than his initial money m plus the monetary transfer τ M −1 and a loan l that he takes out from a bank.
His loan l is subject to the credit constraint given the amount of capital k he has accumulated from the previous night. If the agent happens to be a seller with probability 1 − σ, then he produces q s units and obtains pq s money. At the same time, he deposits d money which is no greater than his initial money m plus the monetary transfer τ M −1 . The agent then moves on to the night market with the remaining money which differs across these events.
The first order conditions are:
where λ ≥ 0 is the multiplier of the buyer's budget constraint, γ ≥ 0 the multiplier of the credit constraint, ρ ≥ 0 the multiplier of the seller's deposit constraint.
It is worth mentioning some properties of the optimal choices in the day-market that are immediate from the above conditions. First, (9) and (14) imply:
That is, the seller produces up to the point where the marginal costs of production per unit of money at day (= 1/p) and at night (= φ) are equal.
Second, (9), (10), (13), (14), (15) yield
The first equality implies that, given φ > 0, the complementary slackness condition for the buyer's budget constraint requires
Similarly, the second equality implies that the complementary slackness condition for the credit constraint requires
Observe that for γ = 0, we have u ( Euler equations We now derive the Euler equations. Using (7), (9), (11), (13), (16), (17) and the envelope condition, V m (m, k) = W m + σλ + (1 − σ)ρ, with an updating, we obtain the Euler equation for money holdings:
In the above equation, the marginal cost of obtaining an extra unit of money today (= φ) equals the discounted value of its expected marginal benefit obtained tomorrow. The marginal value of money is the marginal utility (= u (·)) when a buyer, or an interest payment of an extra unit of deposit (= 1 + i) when a seller.
Similarly, using (8), (10), (12), (13), (15), (17) and the envelope condition, V k (m, k) = W k + σγ, with an updating, we obtain the Euler equation for capital holdings:
where the marginal cost of accumulating an extra unit of capital today (= 1) equals the discounted value of its expected marginal benefit accruing tomorrow. The benefit of capital consists of two parts. On the one hand, the agent obtains the marginal returns (= F (·)) for the nighttime production. On the other hand, if the agent turns out to be a buyer, then he will be able to borrow an extra amount of funds equal to
, since the value of a unit of capital will have to be enough to repay the gross interest payment of his loan. This will generate the benefit of an additional loan given by the marginal utility of daytime consumption (= u (·)) minus the repayment cost (= 1 + i +1 ). Clearly, the higher the net benefit of making a loan as a buyer (= u (q b,+1 )/(1 + i +1 ) − 1), the larger amount of capital investment the agent makes.
It is important to observe from (23) that the benefit of capital holdings (to increase the daytime consumption) generates a possibility that the growth rate of the value of money, φ +1 /φ, affects the capital investment decision by individuals. To see this point, consider a case in which u (q b ) = 1 + i holds and so the credit constraint (5) is slack. In this case, (23) reduces to 1 = βF (k +1 ) where the amount of capital holdings by individuals is determined independently of the money growth rate. When u (q b ) > 1 + i, however, the credit constraint is binding and the level of consumption and capital holdings are jointly determined by (22) and (23). Hence, the binding credit constraint in our model provides a channel through which monetary policy, determining φ +1 /φ, can affect the individual decisions on both consumption and capital investment.
Market-clearing conditions So far, we have described the decision problems of a given individual agent taking the market prices p, φ, i as given. Each of the prices are determined by the respective market-clearing condition. These are the last requirements for symmetric and steady-state equilibria in our model. For the daytime goods, since all buyers buy q b units and all sellers sell q s units at any given period, the day-market clearing condition is given by
For the nighttime goods, note that the level of nighttime consumption is bound to differ across agents depending on their daytime activity, while the level of capital holdings is not. Hence, the night-market clearing condition is given by
where X denotes the aggregate nighttime consumption which can be reduced to an expression with x satisfying (6) averaged over buyers with σ and sellers with 1 − σ.
For the loans and deposits, all the credit deals are made through the competitive banks.
Note that given the credit constraint, it is possible that the interest rate i ≥ 0 does not adjust to yield the demand-supply balancing. Hence, if there is excess supply in the credit market when i = 0, we assume that the banks can hold voluntary reserves. This is consistent with our earlier assumption that sellers always deposit their money holdings when indifferent to doing so. Given this possibility, the credit-market clearing condition becomes
where µ ∈ [0, 1] represents the rate of bank reserves.
Existence, uniqueness and characterization of steady-state equilibrium We now solve for equilibrium. We focus on steady-state equilibria where the aggregate real money supply, given by φM , is constant over time. So, we have Any steady state equilibrium requires x > 0 for all agents, although we have not imposed it. In order to guarantee this, we assume
where q * b , k * are the first best level of consumption and capital satisfying (3) and (4) . This inequality in turn requires an appropriate scaling of the production (or the utility) function.
To solve for equilibrium, the following lemma provides a useful guideline. By (19) and (21), the binding budget constraints for buyers and sellers imply
Lemma 1 shows this equation holds for any i ≥ 0. Further, when i = 0, buyers have a strict incentive to borrow and Lemma 1 shows the credit constraint is binding for any π > β. As already mentioned, there is a possibility of an excess supply in credit market in this case.
Applying the binding credit constraint with i = 0 (i.e. φl = k) and (27) to (26) yields u (q b ) q b , and on the first best level of capital k * = F −1 (1/β) relative to σ and q * b = u −1 (1).
there is a unique equilibrium with unconstrained credit for any π ∈ (β, ∞). (B) If k * < (1 − σ) q * b , there exist two critical levels of inflation rate, denoted by π andπ, such that a unique equilibrium exists: (i) with constrained credit and i = 0 for π ∈ (β, π); (ii) with constrained credit and i > 0 for π ∈ [π,π];
there exists a unique equilibrium with unconstrained credit for any π ∈ (β, ∞). If k * = (1 − σ) q * b , a unique equilibrium exists with constrained credit and i > 0 for any π ∈ (β, ∞). (B) If k * < (1 − σ) q * b , there exists a critical rate, denoted by π , such that a unique equilibrium exists with constrained credit and: (i) i = 0
, there exist two critical rates, denoted byπ andπ , such that a unique equilibrium exists: (i) with unconstrained credit for π ∈ (β,π );
(ii) with constrained credit and
If k * = (1 − σ)q * b , a unique equilibrium exists with constrained credit and i > 0 for π ∈ (β, π ]. If k * < (1 − σ) q * b , there exist two critical values, denoted by π andπ , such that a unique equilibrium exists with constrained credit and: (i) i = 0 for π ∈ (β, π ]; (ii) i > 0 for π ∈ (π ,π ]. In each case, for π >π , π > π or π >π , an equilibrium may not exist. In the other cases depicted in Figure 2 -6, accumulation of capital is affected by inflation and thus by monetary growth for some range of the inflation rates. Essentially, accumulating capital over and above its first best level is a way for agents to relax their borrowing constraint, when the first best level itself is not abundant enough to perform fully both its productive and its collateral role. In turn, when capital is above the first best, monetary growth can affect its accumulation.
There are two margins that determine the type of equilibria and the effect of inflation. In the first margin, production technologies determine the level of capital that can be used for collateral, and the tightness of borrowing constraint given the level of consumption. When the marginal product of capital F (·) is high, capital itself is at a low level. Hence, it is more likely that buyers face the binding credit constraint when k * (= F −1 (1/β)) is low (as shown in Figure 2 , 3, 6) than when k * is high (as shown in Figure 1, 4, 5) . In all the former cases, observe that an equilibrium arises at low inflation rates with i = 0, because at low rates of inflation the real value of money balances and consumption are at high levels, which makes the borrowing constraint strictly tight when capital is scarce.
In the second margin, the benefit of an extra loan net of repayment costs, given by u (q b )/(1 + i) − 1, determines the buyers' demands of collateral loans, and the tightness of borrowing constraint given the level of capital. To see this, consider first the equilibrium with i = 0. Within this region, the repayment rate of a loan is fixed at 1 + i = 1 while the cost of holding money increases in response to inflation. This implies that the net benefit of an extra unit of loan is given by u (q b ) − 1 and increases in response to inflation, thereby when i = 0 agents accumulate more capital and obtain a larger fraction of loans as the rate of inflation increases. 9 As the total amount of loans gets sufficiently large due to the abundance of capital, the other type of equilibrium occurs at some inflation rates where there are no idle deposits held by banks and the credit market clears at i > 0.
When there is no excess supply in credit market, the interest rate adjusts to balance demand and supply. In this situation, inflation leads to an increase in i > 0 which in turn raises buyers' repayment cost of making a loan. Hence, an occurrence of the binding credit constraint and behavior of capital reflect the behavior of marginal costs and benefits of bank loans, relative to that of money holdings. The elasticity of day-time demand to inflation captures this margin, when i > 0, and so we build our intuition using the following property. 
Discussion
The main assumptions of the model are limited enforcement of contracts, anonymity and impossibility to monitor agents and the fact that capital is observable and verifiable. In our framework, they imply that agents can always refuse to work, agents can walk away with whatever output they produced, but their asset can be seized by the bank. will over-accumulate it in order to use it as collateral for bilateral loans. In such a situation, trading with money and bank loans can reduce the over-accumulation of capital. This is true, obviously, for the region of the parameters space where over-accumulation doesn't happen. But even when over-accumulation does happen in equilibrium, capital is over-accumulated less in a monetary economy than in a non monetary one, since money allows agents to economize on it.
Thus, if capital is relatively scarce, there exist a monetary equilibrium with bank loans which dominates the non-monetary equilibrium with bilateral collateralized loans. Such a conclusion also holds in case banks themselves start issuing private notes backed by collateral.
Conclusion
We considered an economy with lending and capital accumulation where capital can serve as collateral for consumption loans. We found scenarios where inflation affects capital accumulation and agents accumulate capital over and above its First Best level.
We believe the current model would be a fruitful framework to address, in future research, the question of the role played by the price of the durable good in explaining the persistence and amplification of monetary shocks.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1, 2, 3
In the main text, we have shown that (6), (17), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26) are the equilibrium requirements in our economy. All that remains here is to find a solution q b , k, q s , x, d, , l, p, φ > 0, i, µ ≥ 0 to these equations. The equilibrium system can be reduced to the following equations that determine q b , k, i, µ:
To derive these equations, we use (17), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (26). In what follows, we first show the existence and uniqueness of q b , k > 0, i, µ ≥ 0 to (28)-(31). There are six cases, depending on the coefficient of relative risk aversion, denoted by α ≡ −u (q b )q b /u (q b ), and on the efficient level of capital k * = F −1 (1/β) relative to σ and q * b = u −1 (1). We examine each case in separation below. Given this solution, the equilibrium solution of other variables q s , x, d, , l, p, φ > 0 is then identified by using (6), (24), (25), (26). This solution satisfies (6) , (17), (19), (20), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25), (26) and so describes equilibrium.
Case 1-A: α < 1 and k * ≥ (1 − σ)q * b . For any π ∈ (β, ∞), an equilibrium is without binding credit-constraint, exists, is unique and satisfies:
. Proof of Case 1-A. First of all, note that because equilibrium requires u (q) ≥ 1+i, (28) and (29) imply that:
, this further implies that, an equilibrium, if it exists for π close to β, must be without binding credit-constraint, and µ = 0 and q b , i, k > 0 satisfy:
Second, observe that:
q b is strictly decreasing in π when (32) holds. Hence, when the credit constraint is not binding and α < 1, the total amount of debt payment, given by
is strictly decreasing in π > β. Because k is independent of π (in (34)), this implies that
hold and the credit constraint is not binding for all π > β, where equilibrium must satisfy (32)-(34). A solution to these equations exists and is unique, given our assumptions on u(·) and f (·). A similar procedure applies to obtain the solution for k * = (1 − σ)q * b , because the credit constraint must not be binding for all π > β, when α < 1 and k * = (1 − σ)q * b . Given this solution, noting equilibrium satisfies
implies that a solution for φ, p, d, l, q s > 0 exists and is unique. Finally, given these equilibrium values, we identify the equilibrium value of nighttime consumption x. Eq. (6) implies for an agent who has been a buyer during the day, it holds that:
where the first equalities follow from the fact that the buyer does not carry money when entering the night market and φm + = φd = σq b , and the last two inequalities follow from
Similarly, an agent who has been a seller has q s money at the start of the night market and so
Therefore, the equilibrium exists and is unique. 10
Case 1-B: α < 1 and k * < (1 − σ)q * b . An equilibrium exists, is unique and implies that: the credit constraint is binding with i = 0 for π ∈ (β, π); the credit constraint is binding with i > 0 for π ∈ [π,π]; the credit constraint is not binding for π ∈ (π, ∞), given lim
Proof of Case 1-B. Observe first from (28) and (29) that q b → 0, i → ∞ as π → ∞, and hence from (29) and (30) 
This implies that if an equilibrium exists for a sufficiently large π, then it must be without binding credit-constraint. Hence, given k * = k < (1 − σ)q * b = (1 − σ)u (q b )q b around π close to β and u (q b )q b is strictly decreasing in π (when the constraint is not binding and α < 1), there exists a unique cutoff value, denoted byπ ∈ (β, ∞), that solves
such that an equilibrium is without binding credit-constraint for π >π and is with binding credit-constraint for π ≤π. As shown in the proof of Case 1-A, µ = 0 and q b , k, i > 0 are a unique solution to (32)-(34) when the constraint is not binding, and so for π ∈ (π, ∞) an equilibrium exists and is unique given
Hence, for π close to β, if an equilibrium exists then it must satisfy i = 0 and q b , k, µ > 0 that are given by
Denoting by π ∈ (β,π) a unique solution to k = (1 − σ)q b (which leads to µ = 0), for
exists and is unique. Given this solution, the other equilibrium values are uniquely identified by d = M > 0,
which follows from k * < k < (1 − σ)q * b and our assumption that F (k * ) > q * b + (1 − σ)q * b . Observe above that µ is strictly decreasing in π and takes the minimum µ = 0 at π = π. This means, if an equilibrium exists for π > π, then it must satisfy µ = 0 and thereby i > 0 (whenever k = (1 − σ)(1 + i)q b ). Hence, for π ∈ (π,π) define:
using (28) 
which are obtained by applying µ = 0 to (28) and (30). Note k ∈ (k * , k) and i > 0 satisfying (40) and (41) are both strictly increasing in q b ∈ (q b , q b ) (given π), hence the solution exists and is unique. The other equilibrium values are uniquely identified by the same procedure as before, except that
follows from k * < k < (1 − σ)q * b and our assumption that 
, an equilibrium, if it exists for π close to β, must be without binding credit-constraint (i.e., k > (1 − σ)(1 + i)q b holds) and µ = 0 where q b , i, k are determined by (32)-(34). Further, α = 1 implies u (q b )q b is constant with respect to q b , and so
for any π ∈ (β, ∞). Hence, for any π ∈ (β, ∞) the credit constraint is not binding and µ = 0 and q b , i, k > 0 are given uniquely by (32)-(34). Identifying the other equilibrium variables, which exist and are unique, follows the same procedure as before where in particular
for all π > β, and so the equilibrium must be just binding credit constraint with i > 0 where the same procedure applies to establish its existence and uniqueness.
Case 2-B: α = 1 and k * < (1 − σ)q * b . An equilibrium is with binding credit-constraint, exists, is unique and satisfies i = 0 for π ∈ (β, π ), and i > 0 for π ∈ [π , ∞).
Proof of Case 2-B. When k * < (1 − σ) q * b and α = 1, an equilibrium must be with binding credit-constraint for any π ∈ (β, ∞). Further, as in Case 1-B, there exists a unique cutoff value π ∈ (β, ∞) such that equilibrium implies and i = 0 for π < π , and i > 0 for
, where π = π yields k = (1 − σ)q b and i = 0. Finally, for all π ∈ (β, ∞), we have k * < k < (1 − σ)q * b and so
Case 3-A: α > 1 and k * > (1 − σ)q * b . For π ∈ (β,π ) an equilibrium exists, is unique and implies that the credit constraint is not binding for π ∈ (β,π ); the credit constraint is binding
Proof of Case 3-A. Observe first from (28) and (29) 
implies that if an equilibrium exists, then it must be with binding credit-constraint for a sufficiently large π.
is strictly increasing in π (when the constraint is not binding and α > 1), there exists a unique cutoff valueπ ∈ (β, ∞) that solves (35). That is, an equilibrium is without binding credit-constraint for π <π and is with binding creditconstraint for π ≥π . As shown in the proof of Case 1-A, µ = 0 and q b , i, k > 0 are a unique solution to (32)-(34) when the constraint is not binding, and so for π ∈ (β,π ) an equilibrium exists and is unique given 
at π =π given F (k * ) > k * + q * b . Hence, there exists someπ ∈ (π , ∞) such that x > 0 and hence the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium are guaranteed for π ∈ [π ,π ).
Case 3-B: α > 1 and k * ≤ (1 − σ)q * b . If k * = (1 − σ)q * b , an equilibrium exists and unique, with the binding credit-constraint and i > 0 for π ∈ (β, π ). If k * < (1 − σ)q * b , an equilibrium exists and unique, with the binding credit-constraint and i = 0 for π ∈ (β, π ), and with the binding credit-constraint and i > 0 for π ∈ [π ,π ).
Proof of Case 3-B. Note first that given α > 1 and k * ≤ (1 − σ)q * b an equilibrium, if it exists, must be with binding credit-constraint. Observe that when π → β, (28)-(31) imply q → q * , k → k * , i → 0, µ → µ * ≡ 1 − σk * /(1 − σ)(q * b − k * ) ≥ 0 (with equality when k * = (1 − σ)q * b ). Consider first the case k * < (1 − σ)q * b . If an equilibrium exists for π close to β, then it must satisfy i = 0 and q b , k, µ are given by equations (36)-(38). As shown in the proof of Case 1-B, a solution q b ∈ [q b , q * b ), k ∈ (k * , k ], µ ∈ [0, µ * ) to (36)-(38) exists and is unique for π ∈ (β, π ), where π = π ∈ (β, ∞) yields k = (1 − σ)q b (which leads to µ = 0). For π ∈ [π , ∞), we must have µ = 0, and q b ∈ (0, q b ), k ∈ (k , ∞), i ∈ (0, ∞) are unique solution to (39)-(41), where π = π yields k = (1 − σ)q b and i = 0. When k * = (1 − σ)q * b , because µ → 0 as π → β, if an equilibrium exists for π close to β, then it must be with binding credit-constraint and i > 0. In this case, there exist a unique solution q b ∈ (0, q * b ), k ∈ (k * , ∞), i ∈ (0, ∞) to equations (39)-(41).
Finally, x > 0 can be guaranteed for π ∈ (β,π ] (when k * < (1 − σ)q * b ) and for π ∈ (β, π ] (when k * = (1 − σ)q * b ) given F (k * ) > q * b + (1 − σ)q * b , where π =π (when k * < (1 − σ)q * b ) or π = π (when k * = (1 − σ)q * b ) yields k = (1 − σ)q * b .
Proof of Proposition 4
When the credit constraint is not binding, (34) determines k = k * which is independent of π. When the credit constraint is binding with i > 0, (37) determines k = k(π) > k * which is strictly increasing in π > β. When the credit constraint is binding with i = 0, (40) determines k = k(π) ≥ k * , given q b > 0 satisfies (39). In this case, noting that
gives: 
Proof of Corollary 1
There are two cases for µ = 0. First, when the credit constraint is not binding, (32) determines q b = q b (π) and implies that:
which yields: α π 1 if and only if α 1. Second, when the credit constraint is binding, (39) determines q b = q b (π). In this case, applying (39) to (42) yields:
In the last expression above, observe that the terms in the bracket are positive, thereby we have: α π 1 if and only if α 1. 
